Tatar v Public Prosecutor
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
Introduction
1. The appellant pleaded guilty to a charge of sexual intercourse without consent (rape), [1] committed when he was aged 15 years. He was 16 at the time of sentence.[2] The victim was aged 16 years, also a young person.
2. The appellant was sentenced to 4 years 5 months 14 days imprisonment. The sentence was not suspended. He now appeals against the severity of the sentence.
3. It is contended that the sentence is manifestly excessive because:
a. There was an error in the calculation of the sentence
b. That there was insufficient recognition of the appellant’s young age as a personal mitigating factor.
c. That in light of the fact the appellant was 15 when he committed the rape, the sentence should have been partially suspended.
4. The notice of appeal was outside of the 14 day time limit provided in s 201(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code [CAP 136]. Therefore, an enlargement of time is required. Mrs Tamau for the respondent, did not oppose an enlargement of time. We therefore granted an enlargement of time to appeal.
The facts
5. The appellant and the victim are from the same village. As we have said, the victim was aged 16 years and the appellant was aged 15 years at the time of the rape.
6. On 4 September 2024, both the victim and appellant attended a birthday celebration for the victim. The celebration took place at a coconut plantation some distance from their village. As they were returning to their village, the victim, who was intoxicated, fell to the ground. The appellant was asked to assist. Instead of assisting the victim, he had sexual intercourse with the victim without her consent. As a result, the victim became pregnant. She became aware of the pregnancy about a month after the sexual intercourse took place. The victim then spoke to the appellant who confirmed they had sexual intercourse.
7. A report was made to police. When interviewed by the police, the appellant admitted the offending.
Sentence
8. The maximum sentence for rape is life imprisonment.
9. The primary judge set a starting point of 6½ years imprisonment for the rape, taking into account the aggravating factors, the guideline case for rape, Public Prosecutor v Scott [2002] VUCA 15, and comparable cases.
10. In setting the starting point, the primary judge took into account the following aggravating factors:
a. Breach of trust, as the appellant and the victim are from the same area, and the act caused distrust amongst their families;
b. The offending occurred at night in the bushes;
c. The offending was committed under the influence of alcohol;
d. The victim was completely intoxicated and the defendant took advantage of this;
e. The victim suffered physiologically from the humiliation and the emotional pain; and
f. The offending resulted in pregnancy.
11. There were no mitigating factors of the offending.
12. The sentence was reduced by 30% for the guilty plea. In reducing the sentence, the primary judge also noted the appellant’s youth and lack of prior criminal history. So, it is not entirely clear whether the sentence reduction also reflected those personal factors. For reasons which we will shortly explain, reductions for a guilty plea and personal factors should be separately identified.
13. The sentence was reduced by a further 2 months for personal factors; that the appellant was 15 at the time are of the offence; was still at school; was of good character; and had performed a customary reconciliation to the victim and her family, which was accepted. He was fined VT 1,000. The primary judge noted the appellant was also remorseful.
14. There was a further 4 day reduction to the sentence as the appellant spent 2 days in custody before sentence.
15. The end sentence was 4 years 5 months 14 days imprisonment, which was not suspended. The sentence commenced immediately on 20 February 2026.
Approach to appeal
16. In Naio v Public Prosecutor [1998] VUCA 1, this Court adopted the principles applying to sentence appeals set out in the decision of the High Court of Australia in Skinner v R (1913) 16 CLR 336 at 340 and stated that those principles should be applied in Vanuatu. In Skinner, the High Court said that an appellate Court considering a sentence appeal should not determine that a sentence was manifestly excessive or manifestly inadequate unless that was obvious, such as where the sentencing judge has acted on a wrong principle, or had clearly overlooked, undervalued, overestimated or misunderstood some relevant features of the evidence.
Were there errors in the sentence?
17. Mrs Karu contends there were errors in the sentence, as detailed above. For the respondent, Mrs Tamau accepted that the primary judge erred in the construction of the sentence in two ways;
a. There was a minor mathematical error in reaching the end sentence; and
b. The 2 month reduction for personal factors was insufficient to recognize the appellant’s age at the time of the offending.
A mathematical error?
18. We agree with Mrs. Tamau that there is a minor mathematical error in the sentence construction, and that the end sentence should have been 4 years 4 months 14 days imprisonment, calculated as follows:
| Step 1 Sentence starting point | 78 months (6 ½ years) |
| Step 2 Guilty plea reduction (30%) | 23.4 months |
| Personal factors reduction (2.7%) | 2 months |
| 52.6 months (4 years 4 months 18 days) | |
| Time spent in custody |
4 days
|
| End Sentence: | 4 years 4 months 14 days imprisonment |
Youth reduction
19. Mrs Karu contends that insufficient weight was given to personal factors capable of mitigating the sentence, particularly the appellant’s age at the time of the offending. This is in light of the observations made by this Court in Heromanley v Public Prosecutor [2010] VUCA 25 and Tabeva v Public Prosecutor [2018] VUCA 55.
20. Mrs Tamau acknowledges that the principles relevant to sentencing young offenders should be applied consistently. As such, she accepts there should have been a greater allowance for youth.
21. Starting with Heromanley, this Court has recognized that sentencing of young people may require different considerations. [3] While Heromanley did not involve serious sexual offending, nevertheless the principles about sentencing of young offenders remain applicable. This Court said:
17. Whilst the sentencing of young offenders is never an easy task the objectives and the interests of society are not seriously in doubt. It is to enable young offenders to be rehabilitated and grow up to become responsible law-abiding members of society. This purpose is discernible from the provisions of sections 37, 54 and 58H of the Penal Code Act [CAP. 135]. In the sentencing of young offenders we consider that the dual purposes of punishment and deterrence may need to give way to reform and rehabilitation.
22. In Tabeva, after considering s 54 of the Penal Code and Vanuatu’s ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (“UNCROC”), this Court said that those provisions all stress the importance of avoiding prison for young persons if at all possible, but noting such principles must always be balanced against the seriousness of the crime actually committed by the young person.
23. In other jurisdictions, an offender’s age has been held to be relevant to sentencing because there are age-related neurological differences between young people and adults. These include that young people may be more impulsive than adults, and more susceptible to negative influences. Long sentences can have a crushing effect on young people, who are recognized as having a greater capacity for rehabilitation. There is a benefit to the community from achieving such an outcome in a young person. [4]
24. In G v R, [5] the New Zealand Supreme Court recently summarized the characteristics of offending by young people and said: [6]
Offending by young people
[38] Settled science and years of judicial experience in relation to the distinctive nature of offending by young people have been usefully summarised in leading appellate decisions. We set the essential propositions out here as relevant background: (citation omitted)
(a) Adolescent behaviour is driven by biology. It reflects the fact that development of the parts of the brain that control executive functioning is not complete until around age 25. Young people tend therefore to undervalue risk, lack foresight and impulse control, and be more susceptible to peer influence.
(b) Young people who commit serious offences will often also have intellectual deficits, mental illness and/or have suffered abuse or other childhood trauma. These characteristics also tend, separately, to mitigate culpability.
(c) Prison is particularly harmful for young people: they are often targeted by older, hardened prisoners; they tend to engage in peer and adult-led antisocial behaviours in prison; and, whether seeking protection from endemic prison violence or a secure sense of identity, young people are far more likely to take on rigid counter-social identities while serving prison sentences.
(d) On the other hand, if they can be kept out of prison, young people are more receptive to treatment than adult offenders and therefore have better prospects of rehabilitation, this because anti-social behaviours tend to be less entrenched than is the case for adult offenders.
(e) Young offending is almost always a passing phase; at best imprisonment lengthens the phase, delaying eventual desistence, and at worst it turns a temporary phenomenon into a resilient characteristic or even a life course.
25. Finally, as the English Court of Appeal said in R v Ahmed, [7] young offenders are not just “cut down version of adult offenders”[8].
26. One of the ways that youth is relevant at sentencing is as a personal mitigating factor. In Hopkins v R, [9] the New Zealand Court of Appeal explained the rationale for recognizing youth as a mitigating factor in the following way:
“[12] The youth of an offender is a recognised mitigating factor because of the neurological differences between young people and adults that may make young offenders impulsive and more susceptible to negative influences. Those factors can reduce their culpability. The damaging effect long sentences may have on young people and their greater potential for rehabilitation are also recognised mitigating factors. We accept these age-related considerations may extend to offenders in their mid-20s. However, the materiality of an offender’s age may vary depending on the circumstances of the particular case and will be a matter of assessment for the sentencing judge.
27. However, youth must be weighed against the seriousness of the offending. The New Zealand Court of Appeal [10] summarized the approach to youth as a mitigating factor as follows:
[83] In the end, a judge sentencing a young person under the Sentencing Act must always weigh the young person’s age and the reasons why he or she offended, against the seriousness of his or her offending and prospects of rehabilitation. Sometimes the young person’s age will be a mitigating factor of high, perhaps decisive, significance not to be circumscribed by any fixed outer percentage. Equally, there can be no warrant for saying that youth, of itself, must always prevail as the paramount value on sentence, or that youth alone can justify radically reducing the sentence which would otherwise be proper.
28. In Tabeva, this Court recognized the relevance of youth as a personal mitigating factor. The 3 appellants were sentenced for a group rape. Mr Tabeva was aged 15 or 16 at the time of the offending. He was sentenced to 2 ½ years imprisonment, which on appeal was partially suspended. Due to Mr Tabeva’s young age, the primary judge allowed a significant reduction in sentence to reflect his youth at the time of the offending. The youth reduction was not challenged on appeal.
29. This appeal involves serious offending, given the victim’s vulnerability and that she became pregnant. However, the appellant was aged 15 when he offended. Without diminishing the seriousness of the rape, the appellant acted impulsively, likely reflective of his immaturity and young age. The reduction applied by the primary judge for all personal mitigating factors was 2 months. A separate reduction for youth was not given. Given the matters just discussed, that was an inadequate reduction to reflect personal mitigating factors. There should have been a greater allowance for youth, given the appellant’s age at the time of the rape. While there must be an individualized assessment as to the allowance for youth, the younger the offender, the greater the reduction for youth may be, given the settled science that brain development is not complete until around age 25. That said, even for a very young offender, the allowance made for youth as a personal factor may be tempered by the seriousness of the offending.
30. Further, as the primary judge set out in the sentence, there were other relevant personal factors, including remorse, as evidenced by custom reconciliation, a custom payment and good character. There were a number of personal factors capable of mitigating the sentence, and so the 2 month reduction allowed by the primary judge was inadequate to appropriately reflect personal factors. Therefore, the primary judge erred in the allowance for personal factors, particularly the reduction for youth.
31. Accordingly, as we consider the primary judge erred in calculating the end sentence and in the allowance for personal mitigating factors, we set aside the sentence.
32. We now resentence the appellant.
Resentence
Step One: Starting point
33. The starting point is to be set with reference to the aggravating and mitigating features of the offending, and with reference to the maximum penalties for the offences.
34. The relevant aggravating factors are:
a. The victim was very vulnerable. First, this was because the offending occurred at night and in the bushes. Secondly, she was very intoxicated, which the appellant took advantage of.
b. The psychological harm caused to the victim.
c. There was unprotected sexual intercourse which resulted in pregnancy. The fact that the sexual intercourse was unprotected, also created a risk of sexually transmitted diseases.
35. The standout aggravating factor is that the offending resulted in the victim, aged 16 years, becoming pregnant. That can only be described as a devastating and life changing consequence of the rape. On the other hand, there was no premeditation. The appellant acted impulsively. Further, there is no suggestion of any force of physical violence beyond that inherent in the rape itself.
36. Scott v Public Prosecutor [2002] VUCA 29 is the guideline case for rape. [11] According to Scott, where a rape is committed without any aggravating or mitigating factors, the starting point is 5 years imprisonment. As detailed in Scott, rape is aggravated by a number of factors. Pertinent to this appeal, one of the aggravating factors identified in Scott is effect on the victim, whether physical or mental, when it is of special seriousness. That factor is present here, given that the victim became pregnant as a result of the rape. The starting point should be higher than 5 years imprisonment.
37. Public Prosecutor v Tulili provides some assistance in assessing the appropriate starting point. Mr Tulili and the victim were related. The rape occurred in the early hours of the morning. The victim was pulled into some bushes and some force was used. The aggravating factors were that the rape occurred at night, use of force, the young age of the complainant, the absence of use of protection with consequent exposure of the victim to sexually transmitted infection and pregnancy, the breach of trust and the impact on the victim. The 5 year starting point adopted in the Supreme Court was not challenged on appeal. But unlike Tulili, the risk of pregnancy actually materialized here, so a higher starting point is warranted.
38. As we have said, the pregnancy is the standout aggravating factor, which can only have had a significant and life changing impact on the victim. We consider that the appropriate sentence start point is 6 years imprisonment.
Step Two: Guilty plea and personal factors
Guilty plea
39. The maximum allowance for a guilty plea is one third when entered at the first reasonable opportunity. [12] In our view, the appellant did not plead guilty at the first reasonable opportunity. He entered a not guilty plea on 19 December 2025. A trial was directed, and a pretrial conference was listed for 13 February 2026. It is unclear from the Court record whether a trial date was actually set. Then on 17 February 2026, the appellant asked to be rearraigned and entered a plea of guilty. While there was an amended summary of facts, the facts did not change in any material way.
40. Given that the plea of guilty came after the appellant initially pleaded not guilty and a trial directed, a sentence reduction near the one third maximum is not appropriate. Consistency is important. To allow such a reduction would undermine the value of an early guilty plea. Nevertheless, the appellant did plead guilty, which shows a degree of remorse, acceptance of responsibility, it saved the victim from having to give evidence, avoided the need for a trial and assisted in the administration of justice by reducing court delays and the saving of court resources. [13]
41. It is a matter of evaluating all the relevant factors, but timing is very relevant. For example, in Jackson v Public Prosecutor,[14] pleas were entered just after the start of a trial. A sentence reduction was applied in the Supreme Court of approximately 25% for plea. This Court said a discount as low as 10 to 15% for the guilty plea alone would have been realistic.
42. The guilty plea was not entered at the first reasonable opportunity, but it saved the victim from the indignity of having to give evidence and showed the victim that the appellant accepted responsibility. Thus, we reduce the sentence by 14½ months (20%) for the guilty plea.
43. One final observation is that the reduction for a guilty plea should be identified separately from personal factors. As this Court said in Tevi v Public Prosecutor, the staged approach to sentencing requires that mitigating factors and the reduction for a guilty plea be addressed separately. Identifying separately the reduction for a guilty plea allows for transparency in the sentencing process. [15]
Personal factors
44. The sentence should be reduced to reflect mitigating factors personal to the appellant, which should be adjusted from the sentence starting point and expressed as a percentage of the starting point. Reductions for personal factors should be proportionate to the starting point, so that end sentences retain an appropriate degree of proportionality. [16]
45. There are a number of relevant personal factors, as we have said. A significant factor is that the appellant was very young. He was aged 15 at the time of the offending, and the circumstances of the offending demonstrate impulsivity and immaturity, underscoring the neurological differences between young people and adults.
46. The appellant is of otherwise good character and there was a custom reconciliation with the victim and her family. A custom payment of VT 1,000 was made.[17] The appellant was remorseful. Together, with the appellant’s youth, these factors demonstrate good potential for his reform and rehabilitation. We reduce the sentence by 21 months (30%) on a global basis for these factors.
Time spent in custody
47. The appellant spent 2 days in custody prior to sentence. The appellant commenced his sentence immediately. Pending appeal then, he has been in custody for approximately 3 months. Section 51(4) of the Penal Code [CAP 135] provides that time spent in custody before trial or appeal is to be deducted from a sentence. Relevantly, it says:
51. Calculation of sentence
…
(4). If the offender has been in custody pending trial or appeal, the duration of such custody is to be wholly deducted from the computation of a sentence of imprisonment.
The sentence is to be reduced by 6 months 4 days for this factor, which equates to a 6 month 4 days prison sentence. This gives effect to s 51 of the Penal Code but also takes into account s 51 of the Correctional Services Act 2006 (“the CSA”). Under s 51 of the CSA, an offender is eligible for parole after serving half of the sentence. As explained by this Court in Moli v Public Prosecutor [2014] VUCA 37, fairness to the appellant requires that the 3 months 2 days the appellant has spent in custody is treated as the equivalent of a 6 month 4 days prison sentence. Otherwise, he would be unfairly penalised, as time spent in custody would not reflect parole eligibility at half of the sentence under s 51 of the CSA.
End sentence
48. The end sentence is 2 years 5 months 24 days imprisonment.
Should there be a partial suspension of the sentence?
49. For the appellant, Mrs Karu contends that there should be a partial suspension of the sentence. Mrs Tamau contends that there should be no suspension of the sentence. She emphasizes not only the seriousness of the offending, but that the interests of the victim count against any suspension of the sentence. She contends that the appellant’s youth is adequately taken into account by applying a reduction for youth as a personal mitigating factor and does not require additional recognition in the final sentence imposed.
Discussion
50. Section 57 of the Penal Code provides a discretion to suspend or refuse to suspend a sentence. Section 57 says:
57. Provision for suspension of sentences of imprisonment
(1) The execution of any sentence imposed for an offence against any Act, Regulation, Rule or Order may, by decision of the court having jurisdiction in the matter, be suspended subject to the following conditions:
(a) if the court which has convicted a person of an offence considers that:
(i) in view of the circumstances; and
(ii) in particular the nature of the crime; and
(iii) the character of the offender,
it is not appropriate to make him or her suffer an immediate imprisonment, it may in its discretion order the suspension of the execution of imprisonment sentence it has imposed upon him or her, on the condition that the person sentenced commits no further offence against any Act, Regulation, Rule or Order within a period fixed by the court, which must not exceed 3 years; and
……
51. As has been said by this Court, in assessing whether or not to exercise the suspension discretion, a balancing of factors against, and factors for, suspension is required. [18]
52. This was serious offending. A young and vulnerable female was raped and became pregnant. As we have said this must have far reaching consequences for her. The victim’s interests should be taken into account and the need for her protection from sexual abuse. [19]
53. This Court has said in a line of authority commencing with Public Prosecutor v Gideon [2002] VUCA 7 that:
“it will only be in the most extreme cases that suspension could ever be contemplated in the case of sexual abuse… Men must learn that they cannot obtain sexual gratification at the expense of the weak and vulnerable. What occurred as a tragedy for all involved. Men who take advantage sexually of young people forfeit their right to remain in the community”.
54. This was reiterated in Public Prosecutor v Scott [2002] VUCA 29, when this Court set aside the suspension of a sentence imposed for rape and said:
“men must learn that they cannot obtain sexual gratification at the expense of the weak and vulnerable. What occurred as a tragedy for all involved but men who take advantage sexually of women forfeit the right to remain in the community
….
The time has long come when all men must know and understand that women have the right to control what they do with their bodies and what sexual activity they involve themselves in. If they cannot not or will not recognize their fundamental position then they cannot remain within the community”.
55. In Public Prosecutor v Tulili, this Court considered whether the Gideon and Scott principles applied to serious sexual offending committed by young people. After an extensive review of all relevant and applicable principles, this Court affirmed that the Gideon and Scott principles concerning suspension remain applicable even when offenders are young.
56. The appellant’s circumstances also need to be weighed in the balance, as required by s 57 of the Penal Code. The appellant was aged 15 years 3 months at the time of the rape. There was no additional violence beyond what was inherent in the rape itself and his actions were impulsive, indicative of his young age and lack of maturity. This was not a rape committed by a mature adult in a premeditated way.
57. While the offending was committed when he was 15, the appellant was not charged until he was 16. But the passage of time does not increase his culpability at the time of the rape. [20] The delay was due to circumstances beyond his control. The complaint was made on 23 January 2025. The appellant was spoken to by police on 28 January 2025. A complaint was laid in the Magistrates Court on 27 February 2025. For reasons unknown, the Preliminary Inquiry was not held until November 2025. By the time the appellant was committed to the Supreme Court for trial, he was aged 16 years. If he had been brought before the Court while he was 15 years, s 54 of the Penal Code, which contains a presumption against imprisonment, would have applied.
58. Section 54 says:
54. Imprisonment of minors
(2) A person under 16 years of age is not to be sentenced to imprisonment unless no other method of punishment is appropriate.
(3) If a person under the age of 16 years of age is sentenced to imprisonment the Court must give its reasons for doing so.
59. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (“UNCROC”) is also applicable. [21] Vanuatu is a signatory to the convention under the Convention on the Rights of the Child (ratification) Act 2006 and its terms are binding in Vanuatu. Article 37 provides:
“…. (b) No child shall be deprived of his or her liberty unlawfully or arbitrarily. The arrest, detention or imprisonment of a child shall be in conformity with the law and shall be used only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time…”
60. As this Court has previously said, ordinarily, suspension would not be contemplated for rape offending. Exceptional circumstances are required. After weighing and balancing the factors for and against suspension, we consider there are exceptional circumstances in this case which mean there is to be a partial suspension of the sentence. The offending is too serious for the sentence to be fully suspended. The appellant should spend a period of time in custody to reflect the serious nature of the offending, the fact that the victim was a young person herself and that the rape resulted in her becoming pregnant.
61. The exceptional circumstances are the following:
(a) The rape was committed when the appellant was aged 15 and a young person. If he had been brought before the Court when he was 15 years, the presumption against imprisonment would have applied. The fact that did not happen was out of his control.
(b) Spending the shortest period of time appropriate in prison meets Vanuatu’s obligation under UNCROC and meets the spirit of s 54 of the Penal Code. As we have explained, there are important reasons to keep young people out of prison, if possible. Prison is harmful to young people, with the risk of engaging in anti-social behaviour and being exposed to negative influences. The combined effect of s 54 of the Penal Code and Article 37 of UNCROC, in the particular circumstances of this case, are potent factors in determining whether to suspend the sentence.
(c) A partial suspension will provide an opportunity for the appellant’s rehabilitation. There are good prospects of rehabilitation, given his age, lack of criminal history, remorse and willingness to make amends to the victim and her family. As detailed in the presentence report prepared for sentencing in the Supreme Court, there are rehabilitation programmes available which will assist the appellant to become a contributing member of society.
62. As can be seen from the discussion above, the appellant’s youth is relevant also to our evaluation of the appropriate end sentence. It is not double counting for youth (or any other personal factor) to be taken into account in the suspension discretion, or in the evaluation of an end sentence generally. We make 4 points.
63. First, youth (or any other personal factor) must be taken into account in the exercise of the suspension discretion. That is because s 57 of the Penal Code expressly requires a judge to balance both the nature and circumstances of the offending, and the offender’s character.
64. Secondly, taking youth into account reflects the settled science that there are neurological differences between adults and young people, which means it is desirable to keep young people out of prison, if possible. This approach is consistent with Tabeva where youth was considered both as a matter of personal mitigation and in the decision to partially suspend the sentence. This does not mean, however, that the suspension discretion will necessarily be exercised in favour of suspension. The seriousness and circumstances of the offending may outweigh youth and require a sentence of imprisonment without suspension, such as rape offending, even when the offender is young, as was held in Public Prosecutor v Tulili.[22]
65. Thirdly, at sentencing, a judge must have regard to the possibility of keeping offenders in the community so far as is practicable and consistent with community safety. This is particularly relevant for young offenders. As the New Zealand Supreme Court said in G v R, [24] young offending is almost always a passing phase.
66. Fourthly, sentencing is an evaluative exercise and should not be formulaic. It must fit both the offence and the offender. When both the culpability of offending and an offender’s personal circumstances, including youth, are considered, the relevant purposes of sentencing become obvious. As this Court said in Heromanley, punishment and deterrence may need to give way to reform and rehabilitation. But for serious offending, such as rape, deterrence and condemnation are important considerations, and may come to the fore in the evaluation of the appropriate sentence for a young offender. [25]
Disposition of the appeal
67. For the reasons given above:
a. The appeal is allowed.
b. The sentence imposed on 20 February 2026 is set aside.
c. In its place the appellant is sentenced to 2 years 5 months 24 days imprisonment, to commence immediately. Of that sentence, 15 months will be suspended for a period of 3 years.
d. A warrant of commitment reflecting the above sentence will be issued.
e. Upon release, the appellant is to also complete a sentence of 12 months supervision to assist in his rehabilitation.
DATED at Port Vila this 15th day of May 2026.
BY THE COURT
Hon. Chief Justice Vincent Lunabek
[1] Contrary to section 91 of the Penal Code [CAP 135].
[2] Public Prosecutor v Tatar [2026] VUSC 38.
[3] See also Tabeva v Public Prosecutor [2018] VUCA 55 and Public Prosecutor v Tulili [2024] VUCA 54.
[4] Rolleston and Roche v R [2018] NZCA 611.
[5] [2026] NZSC 19.
[6] at [38].
[7] [2023] EWCA Crim 281.
[8] at 21.
[9] [2022] NZCA 317.
[10] Pouwhare v R [2010] NZCA 268.
[11] In Scott, this Court adopted the approach taken to rape offending in Public Prosecutor v August [2000] VUSC 73.
[12] See Public Prosecutor v Andy [2011] VUCA 14.
[13] The rationale underpinning a reduction of guilty plea has been explained by this Court in cases such as Taviti v Public Prosecutor [2016] VUCA 41, Pipite v Public Prosecutor [2018] VUCA 53 and Tevi v Public Prosecutor [2024] VUCA 43.
[14] [2011] VUCA 13.
[15] Paragraphs 23 and 24.
[16] See the observations in Moses v R NZCA 296.
[17] A custom payment must be taken into account; s 39 of the Penal Code.
[18] Public Prosecutor v Garae [2025] VUCA 37. See also Malau v Public Prosecutor [2021] VUCA 48.
[19] See Article 37 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (“UNCROC”) and the discussion in Public Prosecutor v Tulili.
[20] R v Ahmed at 22, above n 7
[21] As the appellant is aged under 18, he considered to be a child under the convention.
[22] See also Tabeva v Public Prosecutor.
[23] Section 37 of the Penal Code.
[24] Above n 5.
[25] See Public Prosecutor v Tulili.