Public Prosecutor v Benoit
SENTENCE
Introduction
1. Mr Benoit, you appear for sentence today having entered a plea of guilty to a charge of premeditated intentional homicide contrary to section 106 (1)(b) of the Penal Code [CAP 135]. The maximum penalty is life imprisonment.
The facts
2. The victim, NA, was your partner. When she died, the two of you were living together in a de facto relationship.
3. On 20 February 2026, you and the victim argued. She decided to return to her home village in Malekula. The victim went to the road to go back to her parents’ place, but you took her back to the house, as you were not happy about this decision. You had performed a custom ceremony to her parents, so refused to let her go.
4. Once you were both back at the house, you retrieved a machete from inside the house. It was about 45 cm long. You exited the house. The victim was standing outside facing the bush kitchen. Her back was to the house. Without warning, you approached the victim from behind and cut her to the back of her neck. She fell to the ground. She tried to stand up, but you cut her legs many times. You continued the attack by cutting her a number of times to her hand, fingers and neck. The cuts to her body were to prevent her from getting away from you. Your father, who was present, tried to stop you, but was unsuccessful.
5. Following the attack, you left your village and hid in another village. Your family took the victim to the hospital. However, she died a number of hours later.
6. The victim’s death resulted from your attack on her. She sustained many open wounds that led to a significant blood loss. The victim suffered what is known as hypovolemic shock.
Sentencing purposes/principles
7. The sentence I impose must hold you accountable and must denounce and deter your conduct. The sentence should ensure you take responsibility for your actions and also assist in your rehabilitation. It must also be generally be consistent.
Approach to sentence
8. Sentencing involves 2 separate steps: Jimmy Philip v Public Prosecutor [2020] VUCA 40, which applied Moses v R [2020] NZCA 296.
Starting point
9. The first step is to set a starting point to reflect the aggravating and mitigating features of the offending, and with reference to the maximum penalty for the offence.
10. The aggravating factors of the offending are:
a. The significant breach of trust. The victim was your de facto partner.
b. The attack occurred in the home, where the victim was entitled to feel safe.
c. Use of a machete, a lethal weapon.
d. The attack was premeditated. You prevented the victim from leaving, retrieved the machete and attacked her from behind.
e. The victim was defenceless and vulnerable. This was firstly because she did not see the attack coming, as you attacked her from behind. Secondly, after the victim fell to the ground, she tried to get away, but was unable to do so because she was on the ground and you continued to attack her to prevent her getting away from you.
f. This was gratuitous violence. It was a brutal, callous and frenzied attack.
g. You fled the scene, leaving the victim for dead. You rendered her no assistance. This was callous.
h. Significant harm resulted from this attack. The victim passed away, and her family are grieving.
11. The victim was 2-3 months pregnant at the time she was fatally attacked by you. Ordinarily, that would be a significant aggravating factor. However, this is not referred to anywhere in the agreed summary of facts. I do not know why. The fact of the victim’s pregnancy is detailed in the presentence report. Because the pregnancy does not form part of the summary of facts, I cannot treat that factor as an aggravating feature in this case.
12. There are no mitigating features of the offending itself.
13. In Public Prosecutor v Manap [2018] VUCA 7, the Court of Appeal gave general guidance as to the starting point for premediated homicide, in the event a finite sentence of imprisonment is appropriate. The Court said that generally the starting point should be at least 20 years imprisonment, which would reflect the maximum sentence in unpremeditated homicide (S 106 (1)(a)).
14. In their written submissions, both the Prosecutor and Ms Taleo contend that the appropriate starting point is 20 years imprisonment. Counsel have referred to a number of cases to assist the Court in setting the appropriate starting point. I do not intend to refer to all the cases. The cases that are of most assistance are Tabi v Public Prosecutor [2010] VUCA 40 and Public Prosecutor v Napau [2023] VUSC 74. That is because both cases involve a charge of premeditated homicide of a de facto partner.
15. In Tabi v Public Prosecutor, the Court of Appeal considered that the appropriate starting point for premeditated homicide was 27 years imprisonment. Mr Tabi killed his wife at their home in Santo. After an argument, Mr Tabi took a bush knife to her and caused injuries to her head and neck. While the victim lay on the ground alive, she spoke some words suggesting she thought she might be about to die. Mr Tabi then struck a blow to her head with a wooden stick killing her. Mr Tabi then set about destroying the body in a fire he then prepared. The Court observed that events subsequent to the murder were properly taken into account but did not elevate the offending to the worst example of an intentional homicide. Rather it demonstrated a lack of respect for human remains. The Court said that the circumstances of the offence required a custodial sentence reflecting the loss of life, the brutality of inflicting a second, fatal wound after two head wounds had been inflicted with a bush knife on a spouse in a domestic setting.
16. In Public Prosecutor v Napau, the Honourable Chief Justice set a starting point of 25 years imprisonment for premediated homicide. The victim was Mr Napau’s de facto partner. Mr Napau assaulted the victim at home with a hammer. He prevented a family member assisting the victim, and left the scene shortly after the attack, leaving her bleeding to death and did not make any attempt to help her. Mr Napau was on bail awaiting sentence for offending against the victim at the time of her death. He also had previous relevant convictions. Ms Taleo contends in essence that the present circumstances are not as serious as Napau because you are a first time offender, whereas Mr Napau was awaiting sentence and had a history of violence in the relationship with the deceased. However, in setting the starting point, the Chief Justice did not take into account the history of violence or that he was on bail awaiting sentence. Those factors were described as personal mitigating factors. 1
17. I accept that a finite sentence should be imposed. While this was very serious offending, the circumstances are not such that life imprisonment is needed to meet the relevant sentencing purposes and principles. Relevantly, you are also a relatively young man, as I will shortly discuss. You also appear to have good prospects of rehabilitation if you can get your jealousy and anger under control. I should add that the prosecutor did not seek life imprisonment.
18. Given the aggravating factors present in this case, and the starting points adopted in Tabi v Public Prosecutor and Public Prosecutor v Napau, a starting point of 20 years imprisonment is too low. This was a brutal and callous attack on a vulnerable and defenceless young woman. She was your partner, so there was a gross breach of trust. She had no chance to defend herself because you attacked her from behind, and then when she tried to get away from you while on the ground, you continued the attack to prevent her from doing so. You then fled the scene, without trying to help her at all. You also prevented you father from coming to her aid. The harm caused is significant. The offending in the present case is just as serious as the offending in Public Prosecutor v Napau and Tabi v Public Prosecutor. I do though accept that the starting point should be slightly lower than the 27 years adopted in Tabi v Public Prosecutor, given that an aggravating factor in Tabi v Public Prosecutor was the fact that the defendant set the body alight.
19. To reflect the aggravating factors present here, and with reference to Tabi v Public Prosecutor and Public Prosecutor v Napau, I adopt a starting point of 25 years imprisonment.
Step two: guilty plea and personal factors
20. You pleaded guilty at the first available opportunity. While I accept the case against you was overwhelming, there are a number of benefits of your early guilty plea. It saved Court time and resources, but perhaps more significantly, demonstrates to the victim’s family your willingness to accept full responsibility for your actions. The sentence is reduced by one third for this factor. 2 That reduces the sentence by 8 years 3 months.
21. You are aged 20 years and you are a first offender. There is a positive presentence report. You are deeply regretful of your actions that day and are remorseful. I accept that you are genuinely remorseful but consider that the reduction for remorse needs to be tempered by your justification for killing your partner. You told both your chief and the probation report writer that you were upset and angry that the victim had slept with another man. Whether or not that is true, that in no way justifies the taking of a human life.
22. A custom payment of VT 1,000,000 was paid to the victim’s parents. This was following a customary reconciliation conducted on your behalf by your parents. The custom compensation payment was funded from the sale of your kava plants. The compensation payment must be taken into account at sentence. The sentence will be reduced for that factor. 3
23. On a global basis, I reduce the sentence by 3 years (12%) for the relevant mitigating personal factors. You are a first offender, you are remorseful, you are relatively young and a custom payment was made. These factors mean that there should be good prospects of rehabilitation, but only of you get your jealousy and anger under control. In this case, a large youth reduction is not warranted, due to the fact you were aged 20 years at the time and given the seriousness of the offending. This was not an impulsive act, which can be a sign of immaturity. You brought the victim back to the house, armed yourself a knife and attacked her from behind. As the Court of Appeal recently said in Tatar v Public Prosecutor [2026] VUCA 19, the younger the offender the greater the reduction for youth may be. It will always require an individualised assessment. Also, as the Court noted, the seriousness of the offending might limit the extent of the youth reduction.
24. You had been remanded in custody since 22 February 2026. Presentence detention must be taken into account. I intend to backdate the sentence start date to reflect that factor.
End Sentence
25. The end sentence is 13 years 9 months imprisonment.
26. You counsel has rightly not sought suspension of the sentence. For the sake of completeness, I will address the issue of suspension. Under section 57 of the Penal Code, there is a discretion to suspend a sentence. I must take into account the circumstances, the nature of the offending and your character.
27. In assessing whether or not to exercise the suspension discretion, a balancing of factors against, and factors for, suspension is required. 4 You are a first offender, are remorseful, have made a custom compensation payment and at age 20 years, are still relatively young. Balanced against those factors though is that this can only be described as very serious offending. You attacked the victim from behind. She was defenceless. You took a human life in a brutal and callous attack. There was a significant breach of trust. You left the victim for dead and prevented your father from coming to the victim’s assistance. The circumstances and nature of the offending mean that the sentence cannot be suspended. It is too serious. There is a need for deterrence, denunciation and accountability to come to the fore. The victim’s interests also need to be weighed into the mix. The sentence should serve as a reminder that lives matter. Suspension of the sentence would send a very wrong message both to you and others. Accordingly, I decline to suspend the sentence after weighing and balancing the s 57 factors.
28. The sentence is to commence immediately. The sentence start date is backdated to commence on 22 February 2026, to take presentence detention into account.
29. You have 14 days to appeal against the sentence.
30. I make an order suppressing the name and identifying details of the victim.
DATED at Port Vila this 17th day of June 2026
BY THE COURT
………………………………………….
Justice M A MacKenzie
1 Although I infer that Chief Justice intended to refer to them as personal aggravating factors.
2 A one third reduction is also consistent with the approach taken by the Court of Appeal in Taviti v Public Prosecutor [2016] VUCA 41. The rationale underpinning a reduction of guilty plea has been explained by this Court in cases such as Taviti v Public Prosecutor [2016] VUCA 41, Pipite v Public Prosecutor [2018] VUCA 53 and Tevi v Public Prosecutor [2024] VUCA 43.
3 Pursuant to s 39 of the Penal Code.
4 Public Prosecutor v Garae [2025] VUCA 37. See also Malau v Public Prosecutor [2021] VUCA 48.